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CORRESPONDENCE 
Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to 
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig 
Lynn M. LoPucki * 
The same amount of smoke would be released from the factory's 
chimney whether the factory owner or the householder was legally 
responsible for the smoke damage. If this proposition strikes you as 
incredible on first hearing, join the club. The world of zero trans-
action costs turns out to be as strange as the physical world would 
be with zero friction. 
- George J. Stigler1 
INTRODUCTION 
The beating of the drums grows louder. In academia, they beat for 
a market-based solution to the problem of bankruptcy reorganization. 
The product is a steady procession of articles, each calling for the mar-
ket to play a larger role. Most deposit a specific proposal for reform as 
therr offering at the academic altar.2 Outside academia, the drums 
• Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, A.B. 1965, J.D. 1967, Michigan; LL.M. 1970, 
Harvard. - Ed. I wish to thank Samuel Bufford, Bill Campbell, Blair Kauffman, Neil Komesar, 
Donald Korobkin, Marjorie Murphy, Bryan Schneider, Grace Shohet, David Skeel, John 
Thomure, Jay Westbrook, and William Whitford for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this article. My coresearcher, William Whitford, generously consented to the use of data from 
our study, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, that 
has not been included in joint publications. I am grateful for valuable research assistance pro-
vided by John Thomure. 
1. George J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (1972). 
2. Each of the publications listed in the next paragraph questions the usefulness of chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code; each employs a model that in at least certain respects assumes that 
capital markets are perfect or near perfect and that transaction costs are nonexistent or insignifi-
cant. Proposals for reform are noted. 
The suggestion to eliminate chapter 11 was first made by either Baird or Jackson in 1986. 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 223 (1986) ("There is no 
reason why chapter 7 could not be used as the vehicle to sell the firm as a going concern in the 
same way that companies go public."); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986) ("[T]he entire law of corporate reorganizations 
is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually impossible when the debtor is a publicly held 
corporation."). It has been repeated numerous times. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and 
Risk Allocation, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 439, 489 (1992) ("Congress should repeal bankruptcy's 
reorganization provisions."); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 
101 HARV. L. REv. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing to substitute a scheme of reorganization in which 
shareholdings are canceled without compensation unless shareholders pay their prorated share of 
79 
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sound a different message: chapter 11 poorly serves the public by 
holding creditors at bay and thereby protecting incompetent managers 
against the natural consequences of their own mismanagement.3 In 
their provocative call for the repeal of chapter 11,4 Michael Bradley 
and Michael Rosenzweig have fused these highly resonant themes 
with data that purport to show the virtually complete failure of chap-
ter 11 to serve the interests of either creditors or shareholders. With 
publication of this powerful product in the Yale Law Journal, the 
questioning and complaining about chapter 11 have given way to de-
mands for action. Those demands have captured the attention of the 
financial press5 and threaten soon to reach the body politic. 6 
all debts of the company within four days after notice); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in 
the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 
MICH. L. REv. 2097, 2141 (1990) (employing assumptions of perfect markets and other hypo-
thetical conditions to demonstrate that bankruptcy is unnecessary because debtors will liquidate 
and distribute their own assets: "The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that we lack 
any persuasive theory for why we have or ought to have bankruptcy legislation."); Philippe 
Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (May 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) (employing Bebchuk's new approach as part of a "market-based" proposal that 
would substitute for chapter 11). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Effi-
cient?, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 411 (1990) (implicitly employing perfect market zero transaction cost 
assumptions to argue that, because chapter 11 endures, it must be efficient). 
3. E.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Time to Scuttle Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 1992, § 3, at 13 ("[W]e believe that the principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 are corpo-
rate managers ..•• Chapter 11 ..• in fact serves mainly to protect managers' jobs."). Kallen 
argues as follows: 
During the Eighties, Chapter 11 became ..• a powerful tool of megacorporations • • • • 
Chapter 11 permitted megacorporations . . • [and] the men who ran them to escape the 
consequences of their greed and incompetence. If viewed as a government program to pro-
vide large amounts of aid to giant corporations, the Bankruptcy Code has been one of the 
most successful federal programs. 
LAURENCE H. KALLEN, CoRPORATE WELFARE: THE MEGABANKRUPTCJES OF THE 80s AND 
90s, at ix (1991); see also A New Ending for Chapter 11, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 24, 1990, at 13 
("The managers of bankrupt companies are still consigned to the flames in some countries •••• 
But when a big business files for reorganisation under chapter 11 of America's bankruptcy laws, 
it is all too often not the firm's managers who fry."). 
4. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. 101 YALE 
L.J. 1043 (1992). 
5. Articles about Bradley and Rosenzweig's article abound. See, e.g., Emily Barker, Pair 
Puts Spotlight on Chapter 11 's Flaws. AM. LA w., May 1992, at 119; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra 
note 3, § 3, at 13 ("[W]e believe that the principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 are corporate 
managers .•.• Chapter 11 •.• in fact serves mainly to protect managers' jobs."); Wade Lambert 
& Milo Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers Dispute Call for Scrapping Chapter 11 Process, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 19, 1992, at BS (describing efforts of a group of bankruptcy lawyers to organize in 
opposition to the Bradley-Rosenzweig proposal); Andrew Leigh, Are Federal Bankruptcy Laws 
Failing in Their Mission?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 9, 1992, at 4 (describing the Bradley 
and Rosenzweig study, quoting Rosenzweig and several critics); Allen R. Myerson, Rethinking 
the Law That Gives Golden Eggs After the Goose Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, § 4, at 2 
(referring to the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal as "[t]he most radical, attention-getting" and 
referring to the possibility of repeal as "unlikely"); Peter Passell, Economic Scene: Fun, Games, 
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at D2; Michelle Singletary, Panel Votes to Form Bank-
ruptcy Study Body, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1992, at Fl. 
6. See, e.g., John Greenwald, The Bankruptcy Game, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 60 ("A recent 
Yale Law Journal article called for junking Chapter 11 altogether and letting sick companies 
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Much about chapter 11 is in need of improvement. But, as is so 
often the case, the resonant themes are not the right ones. All three 
legs of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument for repeal are seriously 
flawed. The heart of their empirical argument is their claim to have 
shown that financially stronger companies reorganizing under chapter 
11 have been paying less to both their creditors and their shareholders 
than did weaker companies reorganizing under prior law. In Part I 
below, I present several more plausible explanations for the stock and 
bond price phenomena they observed. In all likelihood, their data re:-
flect not a difference in the efficiency of the Act and Code regimes, 7 as 
they claim, but merely the arrival of the junk bond era. Chapter 11 is 
processing more highly leveraged companies. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's provocative assertion that chapter 11 
shields managers from creditors while they expropriate for themselves 
the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders in no way follows 
from their empirical findings, nor is it true. In Part II, I present em-
pirical evidence from several studies to show that during the reorgani-
zation of large, publicly held companies, managers are rarely the 
powerful actors that Bradley and Rosenzweig make them out to be. 
Reorganization managers are more likely to serve creditor interests 
directly or pursue some more complex course calculated to keep 
everybody happy and thereby preserve their jobs and reputations. 
The third leg of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument for repeal of 
chapter 11 is their assertion that, in its absence, the conflicts between 
failing companies and their creditors could be regulated through con-
tracts and markets. In Part III, I argue that their analysis depends so 
heavily on the twin assumptions of perfect capital markets and zero 
transaction costs that it is not helpful in evaluating the usefulness of 
die."); Aaron Pressman, Can Chapter 11 Be Put Back Together?, INV. DEALER'S DIG., Apr. 27, 
1992, at 16 (linking the Bradley and Rosenzweig article with bankruptcy reform legislation cur-
rently pending in Congress). In what was seemingly a response to the Bradley and Rosenzweig 
article, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist commented: 
Chapter 11 has many detractors and some go so far as to reject the notion that financially 
troubled firms should be able to reorganize instead ofliquidat[e]. They argue that Chapter 
11 has a pro-debtor, pro-incumbent management bias that does not foster efficient alloca-
tions of assets. I suspect the debate over these arguments will make the pending bankruptcy 
reform efforts a lively undertaking. 
Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Annual Spring Meeting of the American Bank-
ruptcy Institute, May 18, 1992, AM. BANKR. INST. BULL., May 20, 1992, at 1. 
Articles defending chapter 11 have begun to appear, suggesting that it is now "in play." See, 
e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2 (arguing that, because chapter 11 endures, it must be efficient); 
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Is a Better Alternative, NATL. L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 15. 
7. Bradley and Rosenzweig refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as the Act and to 
filings as pre-Act or post-AcL Their usage is disconcerting to both bankruptcy scholars and bank-
ruptcy practitioners who have, for the past 14 years, consistently referred to the pre-1978 legisla-
tion as the Act and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as the Code. I employ the terminology 
that is in common use. 
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chapter 11. Their strange visions of debtor-creditor relations after re-
peal of chapter 11 are the unique product of the strange world in 
which they conduct their analyses. In Part IV, I generalize from the 
critique of Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal to a more general cri-
tique of the use of perfect market zero transaction cost models in the 
evaluation of procedures for bankruptcy reorganization and perhaps 
other legal regimes as well. 
I. ARE SOCIAL COSTS HIGHER UNDER CHAPTER 11? 
The empirical leg of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument rests on 
an apparent anomaly. They show that the companies filing for bank-
ruptcy reorganization since October 1, 1979 (the Code-filing compa-
nies)8 were, by several measures, financially stronger as they 
approached bankruptcy than were the companies filing before October 
1, 1979 (the Act-filing companies).9 The apparent anomaly is that, as 
the companies approached bankruptcy, the equity and debt securities 
of the still stronger Code-filing companies lost a larger proportion of 
their value than did the debt and equity securities of the weaker Act-
filing companies. 
The difference in the losses was dramatic. Over the two-year pe-
riod preceding bankruptcy, stockholders of the Act-filing companies 
lost only a little more than $.50 per dollar of investment, while stock-
holders of the Code-filing companies lost nearly all of their invest-
ment.10 In the period beginning twelve months before filing and 
ending six months after filing, bondholders of the Act-filing companies 
lost only 42% of their investment while bondholders of the Code-filing 
companies lost 70% of their investment.11 From these data, Bradley 
and Rosenzweig reach their direct empirical conclusion that finan-
cially stronger Code-filing companies were making smaller distribu-
tions to both shareholders and bondholders than financially weaker 
Act-filing companies. To those familiar with the delivered wisdom of 
bankruptcy reorganization, this conclusion is startling; the Code pro-
cedures for reorganization are generally regarded as vastly superior to 
the corresponding procedures of the Act.12 
8. See supra note 7. 
9. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1063. 
10. Id. at 1068. 
11. Id. at 1072. 
12. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 190 (2d ed. 1991) ("[l]t became increasingly obvious that the [Bankruptcy] Act was 
hopelessly out of date ...• The bankruptcy system was perceived to be so obsolete [prior to 
adoption of the Code] that Congress went so far as to make the Rules control over the statute 
itself in case of conflict."); id. at 429 ("A case can be made that the benefits of the new provisions 
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Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument to the point of their direct 
empirical conclusion depends upon some questionable inferences.13 
But the central flaw in their empirical analysis is in their implicit as-
sumption that, by showing that the bondholders of Code-filing compa-
nies fared worse, they had shown that the creditors of Code-filing 
companies fared worse.14 
Bradley and Rosenzweig describe their empirical exercise in a se-
ries of formulae. To understand the significance of their error in treat-
ing bondholders as a surrogate for creditors, one need understand only 
the following definitions and formula: 
V - Market Value of Financial Claims15 
E - Earnings Potential16 
F - Filing Frequency 
T - Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy 
T=F*[E-V] 
That is, the social costs of bankruptcy are equal to the number of 
cases, multiplied by the amount lost in each case. In a very general 
outweigh the obvious loss of protection for widely scattered and relatively powerless public 
debtholders and stockholders. The principal benefit might be that companies will enter Chapter 
11 earlier and therefore will be healthier and more likely to survive when they do ..•• [T]here 
may be an important benefit in jobs saved and investments protected."). 
13. For example, in using the market values of financial claims from the period approaching 
bankruptcy as a surrogate for the distributions made to claim holders under chapter 11, Bradley 
and Rosenzweig implicitly assume that the market correctly anticipated the distributions. In an 
empirical study of cases under the Act, Altman reached the conclusion that the market systemat-
ically overvalued equity shares in the period approaching bankruptcy. EDWARD I. ALTMAN, 
CoRPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 79 (1971). Altman's finding provides an alternative 
explanation for some portion of the relatively high returns to shareholder observed by Bradley 
and Rosenzweig in Act cases, though its applicability depends on the additional, unproved as-
sumption that the market became more sophisticated about bankruptcy in the 1980s. 
I express other reservations about Bradley and Rosenzweig's design infra notes 17, 20, and 
21. 
14. The assumption is introduced in the following passage: 
Despite the relative financial strength of [Code-filing] bankrupt firms, both stockholders and 
bondholders of such firms have experienced significantly greater losses in the [Code] period. 
These results, we believe, suggest that the [Code] has increased management's freedom to 
pursue self-interested operating strategies at the expense of the firm's security holders. The 
[Code], in other words, has weakened the ability of creditors to monitor management effec-
tively .••• 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1067 (emphasis added). 
Later in their article, Bradley and Rosenzweig list the "stakeholders" in a chapter 11 case. 
Id. at 1056 & n.44, 1088 & n.108. The omission of other kinds of creditors from those lists 
suggests that Bradley and Rosenzweig considered the bondholders to be representative of credi-
tors generally, and never contemplated that the missing money might in fact have gone to other 
creditors. 
15. In the term Financial Claims the authors include both debt claims against, and equity 
interests in, the company. See id. at 1057. 
16. The authors use the companies' earnings in the years approaching bankruptcy, as shown 
by accounting numbers, as a surrogate for the entire stream of income that the company would 
earn in the future, reduced to present value. See id. at 1055-57 & n.45. 
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sense, the proposition holds intuitively. If the present value of the fu-
ture earnings of a company facing reorganization (E) is significantly 
greater than the market value of its debt and equity (V}, the market 
must anticipate that some of those future earnings will never reach the 
holders of debt and equity. Bradley and Rosenzweig denominated the 
amount the market expected would go elsewhere as T and called it the 
Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy.17 
To avoid the intractable problem of attempting to place a value on 
future earnings without resorting to market values, 18 Bradley and Ro-
senzweig adopted a risky empirical strategy. If Filing Frequency and 
Earnings Potential both increased at the same time that the Market 
Value of Financial Claims decreased, it would then follow that the 
Social Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy must have increased. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig had little reason to be concerned about 
the numbers of filings: it is common knowledge that the filing rate was 
much higher under the Code than it had been under the Act. That the 
companies filing under the Code were financially stronger was not 
common knowledge, but it was at least plausible.19 Bradley and Ro-
senzweig presented empirical evidence that it was true.20 
17. In so doing, Bradley and Rosenzweig attributed all costs not otherwise accounted for to 
bankruptcy. 
18. Actually calculating the values of the Earnings Potentials of reorganizing companies 
would have required knowing two unknowable kinds of information: what the future earnings of 
the companies would have been without the deadweight costs of bankruptcy; and the rate of 
capitalization the market should apply to those earnings. Bankruptcy scholars and practitioners 
often express their disdain for attempts to fix these kinds of values in Peter Coogan's pointed 
epithet that the present value of a future earnings stream is a "guess compounded by an esti· 
mate." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222, reprinted in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6181, quoted in Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE 
W. R.Es. L. REv. 301, 313 n.62 (1982) (noting that Professor Coogan himself is uncertain 
whether his phrase was as quoted above or, conversely, "an estimate compounded by a guess" as 
he is quoted in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6184). 
19. One would expect that, among the companies that actually contemplate bankruptcy, 
those in the worst financial condition would have the most to gain from filing. Therefore, if the 
filing rate increased abruptly after adoption of the Code, as it did, the additional filers would 
presumably be companies not in such bad financial condition that they could benefit from filing 
Ullder the Act, but in bad enough condition that they could benefit from filing under the Code. 
There is at least one problem with this assumption: the additional filers may have included some 
companies in desperate need of bankruptcy relief, but not legally permitted to file for reorganiza-
tion under the old law. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
20. The evidence is less than entirely convincing. The Bradley and Rosenzweig data show 
that the earnings of Act·filing companies deviated further below the norm for companies of the 
Act period than the earnings of Code.filing companies deviated below the norm for companies of 
the Code period. But the data also show that, as bankruptcy approached, the earnings of Act-
filing companies deteriorated at a slower rate than the earnings of Code-filing companies. Brad-
ley and Rosenzweig attribute the sharper decline in Code-filing companies to "management's 
actual stewardship of the firm in bankruptcy," Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1064 n.60, 
but that renders their argument somewhat circular. The alternative interpretation is that the 
Code-filing companies were in weaker financial condition in the sense that their earnings were in 
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That the Market Value of Financial Claims against reorganizing 
companies would be lower was the least plausible of the propositions 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's strategy required them to prove. They be-
gan by breaking the problem down into two parts: debt and equity. 
They then attempted to demonstrate that the market values of both 
debt and equity of Code-filing companies declined more as bankruptcy 
approached than did the corresponding values for Act-filing compa-
nies. Satisfied that each value had done so, Bradley and Rosenzweig 
concluded that the sum of the two values must have done so.21 
Unfortunately, in determining that the value of the debt of filing 
companies had declined, Bradley and Rosenzweig made a classic error 
in methodology. Its nature is best captured in a joke that empirical 
researchers like to tell. A Samaritan offers to help in the search for a 
valuable item on a generally dark sidewalk. Noting that the Searcher 
is looking only in the small area lighted by a street lamp, the Samari-
tan asks whether that area is where the Searcher lost the item. "No," 
the Searcher replies, "but the light is better here." In gathering their 
data on change in the value of debt claims against the reorganizing 
companies, Bradley and Rosenzweig looked only where the light was 
good. That is, they considered only publicly traded debt (bonds). Un-
doubtedly, their reason for doing so was that market values for the 
publicly traded debt were published, while market values for other 
sharper decline. For another argument that Code·filing companies may actually have been 
stronger financially than Act-filing companies, see infra note 29. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's experimental design rests on the central tenet that the value of a 
company should be a direct function of its current earnings. Bradley and Rosenzweig infer the 
increase in social cost in the Code period from the supposedly more rapid increase in earnings 
than company value from the Act period to the Code period. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 
4, at 1057-58. Why this tenet should hold for companies with positive earnings is apparent: the 
higher these earnings, the greater the cash flow likely available to shareholders. 
But the "earnings" Bradley and Rosenzweig examined to determine what the companies they 
studied "should" have been worth were net cash flows at all. They were nearly all losses. Id. at 
1064 n.59. That is, even though neither company A nor company B recorded positive earnings, 
Bradley and Rosenzweig assume that, if the losses of company B are higher than the losses of 
company A, the stock of company B should sell for less than the stock of company A. 
It should be obvious, however, that the purchaser of stock in a company that is losing money 
is not gauging the value of the company principally by its current earnings. So gauged, the value 
of the company would be negative, and the stock would be worthless. The purchaser of such 
stock is likely gauging the value of the company principally by the resale value of the company's 
assets or the positive earnings expected at some future date. That is, the purchaser has concluded 
that the current losses are not a good indicator of the company's future or its value. To assume, 
as Bradley and Rosenzweig did, that negative earnings alone should be a reasonably accurate 
predictor of company value is to engage in a leap of faith. 
21. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1057. From the finding that the Market Value of 
Financial Claims of Code-filing companies declined faster as bankruptcy approached, Bradley 
and Rosenzweig inferred that the Market Value of Financial Claims of Code-filing companies 
was lower. In making this inference, Bradley and Rosenzweig implicitly assumed that Market 
Value of Financial Claims for Code-filing companies and Act-filing companies were equally high 
at the beginning of the holding periods. The assumption may or may not be warranted. 
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kinds of debt were not readily available.22 The data Bradley and Ro-
senzweig collected showed that the market values of the traded debt 
had decreased; they assumed without commenting that the market 
values of the nontraded debt had done the same.23 
Substantial reason exists to believe that, if Bradley and Rosenzweig 
had looked beyond the light of the published trading data, their find-
ings would have compelled them to reach a different conclusion. Ta-
ble 1 shows the role played by bond financing in the debt structure of 
the Code-filing companies that Whitford and I studied. Table 2 sum-
marizes key aspects of the data contained in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Amounts are stated in millions of dollars. The data in this table were 
drawn primarily from the descriptions of debt contained in the plans 





































All Other Debt 


























22. In our recent study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies, 
William C. Whitford and I deliberately looked outside the light. With substantial funding from 
the National Science Foundation and other sources, we developed a methodology for valuing the 
distributions to nontraded unsecured debt and applied it in 41 of the 43 cases we studied. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 135, 141 (1990). To 
apply those data to prove or disprove Bradley and Rosenzweig's thesis would require a project of 
similar scope and cost to value distributions in comparable Act cases. 
23. See supra note 14. 
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Subordinated Debt All Other Debt 
Bonds Not Bonds Bonds Not Bonds 
KDT $21.2 $63.0+ 
Lionel Corporation $13.4 $143.7+ 
Marion $20.0 $5.2 $226.1 
McLouth Steel $141.4+ 
MGF $99.8 $127.8+ 
Nu Corp $119.1 $1,003.5 
Oxoco $48.0 $4.5 $111.2 
Penn-Dixie Steel $19.1 $3.1 $27.5+ 
Phoenix Steel $4.0 $4.8 $119.0 
Pizza Time Theatre $51.6 $84.3 
Revere Copper $41.2 $215.3 
Salant $62.0+ 
Sambo's Restaurants $105.0+ 
Saxon $43.5 $276.8+ 
Seatrain Lines $47.5 $292.2 
Smith International $77.0 $481.4+ 
Storage Tek $130.9 $1,242.7 
Tacoma Boatbuilding $13.0 $158.6 
Technical Equities $10.0 $492.1 
Towle Mfg. $25.0 $57.4 
Towner Petroleum $146.3 
White Motor $17.2 $13.7 $194.6+ 
Wickes Companies $75.9 $252.4 $148.1 $942.0+ 
Wilson Foods $49.7 $85.8 
Totals $1,414.1 $297.9 $666.7 $16,521.5+ 
+ indicates that the amount is understated because the amount for some component (usually 
secured debt) is unknown 
Total bond debt 












Subordinated bonds $1,414.1 68% 
Other bonds $666.7 32% 
100% 
The summary shows that bonds, the only kind of debt examined by 
Bradley and Rosenzweig, constituted only 11 % of the total debt of 
these companies as they approached bankruptcy. Most of the balance 
of the debt of these reorganizing companies was in the form of loans 
from financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies 
(hereinafter bank debt). The summary also shows that most of the 
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bond debt (68%) was contractually subordinated to the bank debt. 
That is, at the time the bonds were issued, the purchasers contracted 
that they would forgo payment during any period the bank debt was in 
default until the bank debt was paid in full. Thus, the bonds that 
Bradley and Rosenzweig examined were not only a small portion of 
the total debt, but a highly atypical portion. Their atypical nature 
provides the basis for several explanations of the bond value decline 
observed by Bradley and Rosenzweig that do not support their conclu-
sion of a debt value decline. 
The most likely explanation for the sharper decline in bond values 
in companies approaching Code filing than in companies approaching 
Act filing is that the bonds of code-filing companies had more leverage 
working against them. The 1980s were not only the decade of the 
Code; they were also the decade of the junk bond. Between the Act 
and Code periods studied by Bradley and Rosenzweig, there was a 
sharp increase in corporate debt. 24 That increase resulted in only a 
moderate increase in the debt-to-equity ratios of corporations only be-
cause it was accompanied by a sharp increase in the market value of 
the equity of corporations.25 For the companies that filed for bank-
ruptcy, however, the relationship between these increases was differ-
ent. As Bradley and Rosenzweig report, Code-filing companies were 
two to five times more highly leveraged in relation to all companies in 
the junk bond era than Act-filing companies had been in relation to all 
companies prior to the junk bond era. 26 When these sharp deviations 
of Code-filing companies from the norms of their era are added to the 
moderate deviation of Code era norms from Act era norms, it becomes 
clear that the debt-to-equity ratios of Code-filing companies during the 
1980s must have been considerably higher than the debt-to-equity ra-
tios of Act-filing companies. 
Other factors remaining constant, the effect of higher debt-to-eq-
24. See, e.g., Leland E. Crabbe et al., Recent Developments in Corporate Finance, 16 FED. 
REsERVE BULL. 593, 593 (1990) ("[T]he outstanding debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector 
soared as corporations borrowed heavily to finance retirements of equity resulting from restruc-
turing activity [during the last half of the 1980s]."); Henry Kaufman, Debt: The Threat to Eco-
nomic and Financial Stability, in DEBT, FINANCIAL STABILITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A 
SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 15, 18 (1986) 
("Over the two years 1984 and 1985, the debt ofnonfinancial corporations rose by $384 billion, 
while equity contracted by $99 billion."). 
25. Ben S. Bemanke & John Y. Campbell, Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?, 1 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON EcoN. ACTIVITY 83, 83-84 (1988); Crabbe et al., supra note 24, at 599 ("In particu-
lar, the ratio of debt to equity, both measured at market values, has increased only slightly since 
1982, as rising equity prices have largely countered the rise in corporate indebtedness." (citation 
omitted)). 
26. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1094-95 (showing debt-to-asset ratios for Code 
companies two to five times as high in relation to all firms as the debt-to-asset ratios for Act 
companies.). 
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uity ratios will be exactly what Bradley and Rosenzweig observed 
among Code-filing companies: a faster decline in the value of the 
subordinated debt and equity as financial problems set in. That is 
what makes a junk bond junk. To see why, assume that researchers 
attempting to replicate Bradley and Rosenzweig's study drew a Code 
sample consisting entirely of companies worth 100, whose senior debt 
was 90, whose junior debt was 5, and whose shares were worth 5 at the 
beginning of the holding period. In each case, assume the value of the 
company decreased by 10 as it approached bankruptcy. Assume each 
company then reorganized, distributing total value of 90 in accord 
with the absolute priority rule. All distributions from each of these 
companies would have gone to the senior creditors; neither stockhold-
ers nor bondholders would have received anything. If the market had 
anticipated the distribution perfectly, the application of Bradley and 
Rosenzweig's methodology would have yielded findings that the Mar-
ket Value of Financial Claims had fallen to zero. 27 The researchers 
would have concluded that the Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary 
Bankruptcy had absorbed the entire value of the company and that the 
reorganization process had failed completely. 
Had the researchers also drawn a sample of Act-filing companies 
that were less highly leveraged but otherwise the same, Bradley and 
Rosenzweig's methodology would have yielded a finding that the reor-
ganization procedures of the Act were more "efficient." To illustrate, 
assume that the Act sample consisted entirely of companies worth 
100, with senior debt of 75, junior debt of 5, and shares worth 20 at the 
beginning of the holding period. Again assume that the values of the 
companies decreased by 10 as the companies approached bankruptcy. 
The companies then reorganized, distributing total value of 90 in ac-
cord with the absolute priority rule. Stockholders, who received 10, 
would have lost only half their investment,28 while bondholders would 
have been paid in full. Though the two sets of companies performed 
equally well, the Bradley and Rosenzweig methodology would have 
led the researchers to conclude that the Total (Social) Costs of Volun-
tary Bankruptcy had been lower for the Act-filing companies. 29 
27. Recall that the Market Value of Financial Claims is the total value of the stock and debt 
of the company, see supra note 15, and that Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology measures 
the value of bonds as a surrogate for the value of debt. See supra note 14. 
28. Cf. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1068 ("[D]uring the [Act] era, stockholders 
of firms filing bankruptcy petitions lost a little more than $.50 per dollar invested over the stated 
period."). 
29. One possible objection to this example is that its assumption that the typical company 
filing for reorganization was solvent is unrealistic. But Bradley and Rosenzweig's finding that 
the equity of Act-filing companies lost only half its value in the approach to bankruptcy suggests 
that many of the companies were in fact solvent. In our study of the largest, publicly held, Code-
90 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:79 
Another way of understanding this effect is to realize that 
subordinated debt is like equity.30 It carries high risk; it represents 
only the right to what is left after others are paid; and its value de-
pends heavily on the amount of debt to which it has been 
subordinated. When Bradley and Rosenzweig measured the decline in 
value of stocks and bonds, they were essentially taking two measures 
of the fate of equity and leaving the typical debt unexamined. 
Greater leverage also explains the apparently more rapid decline in 
the value of the equity of Code-filing companies. Bradley and Rosen-
zweig did not measure the decline in the values of the companies, but 
only in their equities.31 Because equity was thinner in Code-filing 
companies, it seemed to be disappearing more rapidly.32 
Bradley and Rosenzweig considered the possibility that the greater 
losses suffered by bondholders in the Code era might have resulted 
from the junk bond phenomenon. 33 They noted, consistently with the 
argument I present here, that bond rating agencies judged the bonds of 
their Act-filing companies to have been of significantly higher quality 
than the bonds of their Code-filing companies. Nevertheless, they re-
jected the possibility that the Code-filing companies "generally issued 
'junk bonds' while their [Act-filing] counterparts issued high-quality 
bonds" because the Code-filing firms were "financially stronger (and 
therefore less likely to have to resort to junk bond financings)."34 
In reaching this conclusion about the quality of bonds the compa-
nies in their study might have issued, Bradley and Rosenzweig appear 
confused by the odd terminology they employ. They seem to have 
forgotten that even the "financially stronger" group of Code-filing 
companies were in fact losing money during the period under study3s 
filing companies, Whitford and I found that 13 of 43 were solvent in the sense that their share-
holders were entitled to a distribution under a strict application of the absolute priority rule. See 
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 141-43, 164-68. Bradley and Rosenzweig present data 
showing abnormally high debt-to-asset ratios for companies filing during the Code era, see supra 
note 26, suggesting (contrary to the main thrust of their argument that Act-filing companies were 
financially weaker) that solvent companies may have been more prevalent among Act-filers. 
30. See Crabbe et al., supra note 24, at 602-03 (arguing that the difference between debt and 
equity as sources of corporate financing has narrowed significantly during the junk bond era). 
See generally Richard E. Mendales, The New Junkyard of Corporate Finance: The Treatment of 
Junk Bonds in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137 (1991). 
31. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1067-68. 
32. That is, when the equity of the highly leveraged Code-filing company posited supra text 
accompanying note 27 falls by 10, it registers as a 100% loss. When the equity of the corre· 
sponding less highly leveraged Act-filing company posited supra text accompanying note 28 falls 
by 10, it registers as only a 50% loss. 
33. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1072 & n.72. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1064. 
October 1992] Co"espondence 91 
and were probably not capable of issuing bonds of even junk grade. 
The bonds dealt with in the reorganization case were almost certainly 
issued at some earlier point in time. Bradley and Rosenzweig cannot 
escape this argument by speculating that the Code-filing companies 
were also stronger before the period covered by the study and there-
fore less likely to have to resort to junk bond financing; they implicitly 
postulated that, at the beginning of the period of their study, the two 
sets of companies were of equal financial strength. 36 
Perhaps even more importantly, Bradley and Rosenzweig's as-
sumption that the strength of the issuing company is the only determi-
nant of the quality of its bonds is incorrect. Whether the bonds are 
subordinated, the amount of debt to which they are subordinated, and 
the total debt load of the company are all important factors in render-
ing bonds "junk." 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's complex empirical design implicitly as-
sumed that the variables they considered were the only ones that 
changed from the Act era to the Code era. Yet there were probably 
several other systematic changes that contributed to the observed de-
cline in the distributions to bondholders under the Code. First, some 
reason exists to believe that publicly traded bonds were less likely to be 
subordinated during the Act period. 37 Thus Bradley and Rosenzweig 
may, to some extent, have been comparing the returns on senior debt 
under the Act to the returns on subordinated debt under the Code. 
Some reason also exists to believe that deviations from the absolute 
priority rule in favor of shareholders and bondholders have declined 
between the Act era and the Code era. 38 If such a deviation occurred 
36. See supra note 21. 
37. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corpo-
rate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 651, 661 (1974): 
Chapter X was drawn against a factual backdrop of senior debt held largely by public 
investors, in opposition to equity investment often drawn from other than widespread public 
sources. At present the prevailing pattern may be different; holders of senior debt may 
largely be institutional investors and public investment may be mainly in the form of 
subordinated debentures or preferred or co=on stock. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig drew their sample of Act cases from the period 1964 to 1979. Bradley 
& Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1092. To the extent that the changes described by Blum and 
Kaplan occurred after the contours of the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample were fixed, the latter's 
comparison of Act and Code cases compared the returns to senior bonds (under the Act) with 
the returns to subordinated bonds (under the Code). That the former fare better should hardly 
be surprising. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology does not address this possibility. They report no 
attempt to determine what proportion of the bonds they studied were subordinated. They chose 
to ignore one indication that the bonds of Act-filing companies may have had better covenants: 
bond rating agencies considered the bonds of their Act-filing companies to have been "of signifi-
cantly higher quality." Id. at 1072 n.72; see infra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
38. The evidence is sketchy. We report dollar amounts and percentages for the deviations 
from the absolute priority rule in favor of equity holders under the Code in LoPucki & Whitford, 
supra note 22, at 142. Other empirical evidence illustrates the size of deviations in Code cases. 
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in the Act company described in the foregoing illustration, the effect 
would have been to increase the value of the stocks and bonds without 
increasing the Market Value of Financial Claims or improving in any 
way the efficiency of Act reorganization. 39 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical design also assumes that com-
panies with the same earnings ought to make the same distributions to 
creditors and shareholders. That is, from the fact that Code-filing 
companies with at least the same earnings as Act-filing companies40 
make lower distributions, Bradley and Rosenzweig conclude that 
chapter 11 is operating inefficiently. But the relationship between 
earnings (in these circumstances, the size of the accounting losses be-
ing incurred by the company before it enters bankruptcy) and distribu-
tion-making capacity (essentially the market value of the company) is 
loose at best. 
The lack of a direct relationship is more than just a theoretical 
problem with their argument. For reasons entirely unrelated to the 
efficiency of bankruptcy reorganization, a substantial number of Code-
filing companies probably had less distribution-making capacity per 
dollar of earnings than did Act-filing companies. The flood of compa-
See Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990) (deviations from absolute priority rule represent 
7.6% of total amount awarded to all claimants); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An 
Empirical Investigation of U.S. Finns in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 755 (1989) ("[The results 
of this study] suggest that .•. there are large deviations from absolute priority."); Julian R. 
Franks & Walter N. Torous, How Firms Fare in Workouts and Chapter 11 Reorganizations 15· 
16 (September 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding median deviation 
from absolute priority rule in favor of equity 1.2% of estimated firm value; average deviation in 
favor of all security holders 2.7% of estimated firm value). 
Unfortunately, there is only anecdotal evidence of the size of deviations in cases under the 
Act. Theoretically, deviations from absolute priority should have been impossible because the 
plan was drafted by a court-appointed trustee and had to be approved by the court for compli· 
ance with the absolute priority rule. 6A JAMES W. MOORE & LA WRENCB P. KING, COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ~ 11.06, at 208-09 (14th ed. 1977). But during the Act era, the Securities Ex· 
change Commission actively participated in chapter X cases and may have been effective in fore· 
ing significant deviations in favor of the publicly held securities. Indeed, some argue that chapter 
X practice deviated from the theory to so great an extent that the consequences were apparent 
even in the reported cases. See Note, Absolute Priority Under Chapter X -A Rule of Law or a 
Familiar Quotation?, 52 CoLUM. L. REV. 900, 909-20 (1952). The involvement of the Securities 
Exchange Commission has been greatly reduced under the Code. See, e.g., W ARRBN & WEST-
BROOK, supra note 12, at 428-29. 
39. For example, assume that the 90 available for distribution from one of the Act-filing 
companies in the example supra text accompanying notes 27-28 was distributed as follows: 70 to 
the senior debt, 5 to the junior debt, and 15 to shareholders. Seeing only the 5 and the 15 in the 
light of the street lamp, by Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology, the researchers would have 
concluded that the Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy had been further reduced be· 
cause bondholders were still being paid in full while shareholders were now losing only one 
quarter of their investment. 
40. While Bradley and Rosenzweig's data show that the financial losses of Code-filing com· 
panies were more abnormally high than the financial losses of Act-filing companies, the differ-
ences were minimal. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1064. 
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nies that filed under the Code included a type with limited distribu-
tion-making capacity that had been partially barred from filing under 
prior law: terminally ill companies that could not be reorganized but 
only liquidated.41 Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology makes no 
allowance for this change in the type of company coming into chapter 
11; it holds liquidating companies to the same standards as reorganiz-
ing companies. When terminally ill Code-filing companies fail to pro-
duce as much wealth for shareholders and creditors as reorganizable 
Act-filing companies with comparable accounting losses before filing, 
Bradley and Rosenzweig conclude that something is wrong with chap-
ter 11. But, just as last year's tax return may not show that the tax-
payer's future earning capacity was sharply diminished by a terminal 
disease, last year's income statement42 for a fatally ill company may 
not reflect the hopelessness of the company's condition.43 Permitting 
terminally ill companies to liquidate under the Code, instead of dying 
quietly outside the light of the street lamp as many presumably did 
during the Act regime, undoubtedly lowers the ratio of distributions to 
Earning Potential. But it does not prove the hospital inefficient. 44 
41. Under the Act, the use of Chapter XI to liquidate a company was generally considered 
improper. The leading case was In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951), in 
which the court stated: 
But notwithstanding the breadth of the definition of an arrangement under Chapter XI, the 
arrangement must comprehend something more than a mere surrender by the debtor of all 
his assets for liquidation and distribution to creditors; an arrangement is defined as a "plan 
of the debtor," but there is no "planning" by a bankrupt in proposing that his creditors be 
given what the law provides in liquidation under straight bankruptcy. 
188 F.2d at 885 (quoting a 1950 edition of CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY). To be sure, the bar 
against using chapter XI to liquidate was imperfect. Probably many debtors filed with the full 
intention of later declaring an "emergency" that would warrant a sale of the business. A large 
company that sought only liquidation could file under chapter X if management were willing to 
step aside in favor of a trustee. But the formal bar against filing chapter XI for the purpose of 
liquidating probably also rendered liquidation less common under the Act. 
The Code, on the other hand, specifically authorizes the use of chapter 11 plans that provide 
for the "sale of all or any part of the property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § l 123(a)(5)(D) (1988). 
Under the Code, the use of Chapter 11 to liquidate a company is common. See Lynn M. 
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly 
Held Companies, 78 CoRNELL L. R.Ev. (forthcoming April 1993) (manuscript at 10-12, on file 
with author) Qiquidations were common in chapter 11; on the average, the companies emerging 
from chapter 11 were less than one half the size of the companies entering chapter 11). 
42. Bradley and Rosenzweig used actual past earnings, as reported in the firm's accounting 
statements, as the measure of its "Earnings Potential." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 
1057 n.45. 
43. See supra note 20. 
44. Admittedly, it does not prove the hospital efficient, either. If liquidations were accom-
plished without a bankruptcy filing, as Bradley and Rosenzweig advocate, it is possible they 
would be more efficient. But the decision in 1979 to permit liquidations to take place under the 
direction of the debtor in possession in chapter 11 was a rejection of that argument. The legisla-
tive history does not give reasons for the change. But to those familiar with nonbankruptcy 
liquidations, the reasons are obvious. Without the supervision of a court, the battle over the 
remains of a failed company is rife with costly, wasteful strategizing. See generally LYNN M. 
LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 45-136 (2d ed. 1991). 
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That effects such as these could account for Bradley and Rosen-
zweig's observations does not mean that they do. The returns to credi-
tors from financially stronger companies reorganizing under the Code 
may have been lower than the returns to creditors from weaker Act 
companies reorganizing under the Act. But Bradley and Rosenzweig's 
assertion that they have proved it is a gross exaggeration. I have 
shown at least three more plausible explanations for the sharper de-
cline in stock and bond values in Code-filing cases: 
1. Code-filing companies were more highly leveraged. 
2. The bonds of Code-filing companies were more likely to be 
subordinated. 
3. Deviations from the absolute priority rule were greater in Act era 
reorganizations. 
In addition, I have shown that the comparability of their samples of 
Code- and Act-filing companies is suspect because the former includes 
liquidating companies while the latter does not. Until Bradley and 
Rosenzweig can establish that creditors, not just bondholders, got less 
in Code-filing cases, their startling assertion that the Total Social 
Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy increased with adoption of the Code 
simply remains unproved. 
II. ARE MANAGERS THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES 
OF CHAPTER 11? 
Having satisfied themselves that both shareholders and creditors 
got less in reorganizations under the Code, Bradley and Rosenzweig 
turned to the obvious next question: Where did the money go? While 
they equivocate as to whether the money was lost in operations, 45 was 
pocketed by the managers themselves,46 or disappeared in some ill-
defined combination of the two, 47 they are consistent in asserting that 
One of the principal functions of bankruptcy is to control insolvent debtors and prevent fraud. 
Id. at 17-21. 
45. For example, they attribute "the costs of court supervised corporate reorganizations" to 
"one of two suboptimal managerial decisions: the acceptance of negative net present value 
projects or the rejection of positive net present value projects." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra 
note 4, at 1052. In other words, they attribute those costs to management's investment decisions. 
46. "[T]he means by which [financial economists] imagine that managers extract wealth from 
bondholders for the benefit of stockholders may well be utilized by managers to expropriate for 
themselves the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders." Id. at 1051-52. "Presumably, the 
longer managers can retain control of their firm, the greater the wealth they can extract from the 
firm's stakeholders." Id. at 1075. 
47. At one point in the article, they seem to suggest that not all of the missing money was 
lost through suboptimal managerial decisions: "The costs of these suboptimal managerial deci-
sions are a major component of the social costs of court-supervised corporate reorganizations." 
Id. at 1052. At another, they blur the distinction between the incentives of managers and those 
of equity holders: "Students of financial economics have long recognized the incentives of corpo-
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management are the culprits.48 They "conjecture that the [Code's] 
principal beneficiaries have been corporate managers."49 
Whitford and I have argued elsewhere that during insolvency, the 
managers of large, publicly held companies have incentives that fre-
quently discourage them from maximizing the values of their compa-
nies. 50 We also report largely anecdotal evidence to support the 
charge that these skewed incentives have in fact taken their toll on the 
value of reorganizing companies.51 To that extent, our findings and 
speculations are consistent with those of Bradley and Rosenzweig. 
But Bradley and Rosenzweig go an important step further in the 
charges they level against reorganization managers. They assert that 
managers benefit from the reduction in the recoveries of stockholders 
and bondholders. They reach their conclusion based on the implicit 
assumption of only three players in the chapter 11 game: stockhold-
ers, bondholders, and managers. If stockholders and bondholders did 
worse, managers must have done better. 
To the extent that Bradley and Rosenzweig assert that managers 
extract wealth for themselves, numerous studies contradict them. 52 
Gilson was the first to publish findings that the supposedly omnipo-
tent53 managers of companies in chapter 11 were highly likely to lose 
their jobs during the case. Bradley and Rosenzweig dismiss Gilson's 
findings with the assertion that "what matters is not the particular 
identity of the managers running the firm in bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion, but rather the latitude (and incentive) these managers have under 
rate managers (equity holders) to effect wealth transfers from bondholders by embracing value-
decreasing operating strategies." Id. At a third, they seem to be suggesting that suboptimal 
managerial decisions enable managers to keep their jobs. See infra note 48. 
48. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1050 ("[T]he data show that Chapter 11 pre-
serves and protects the jobs of corporate managers, not corj>orate assets."). 
49. Id. at 1076. 
50. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Re-
organization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 1993) 
(manuscript on file with author). 
51. Id., manuscript at 3-4, 72-74, 81-83. 
52. See Brian L. Betker, Management Changes, Equity's Bargaining Power and Deviations 
from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies (Mar. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) (finding high CEO turnover during chapter 11 reorganization); Stuart C. Gilson, 
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockho/ders, 21 J. FIN. EcoN. 355 (1990); LoPucki & Whit-
ford, supra note 50, at 64-70 (finding high CEO turnover during chapter 11 reorganization); 
Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms 
(Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding incumbent CEOs experience 
large reductions in their real cash compensation after default, while new CEOs hired from 
outside the firm receive large increases in cash compensation relative to the CEOs they replace). 
53. Throughout their article, Bradley and Rosenzweig paint a picture of management as hav-
ing tremendous power and independence from creditors. For example, they assert that "[f]iling a 
Chapter 11 petition, in effect, is a way to keep control of the firm free from the intrusive monitor-
ing of creditors." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1076. 
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Chapter 11 to pursue suboptimal strategies."S4 If by that they mean 
that the replacement managers will have the same independence from 
creditors that their predecessors had, more recently published research 
again contradicts them. Both Betker and Whitford and I have docu-
mented heavy creditor involvement in the sacking of these managers.ss 
Whitford and I found that, once in office, many of the replacement 
managers align with creditors. s6 Contrary to Bradley and Rosen-
zweig's assertion that the reorganization managers are "actors who do 
not suffer the economic consequences of their actions,"S7 the managers 
of reorganizing companies appear considerably more vulnerable to 
their constituencies than the managers of healthy companies.ss A sub-
stantial minority of them make their livings as professional turn-
around managers. They move from financially distressed company to 
financially distressed company, competing for their positions on the 
strength of their reputations.s9 Creditors usually play a substantial 
role in their selection. 60 Gilson and Vetsuypens found that these man-
agers, whose compensation was fixed in a competitive market, earned 
more than the managers who held onto their offices by means of the 
chapter 11 filing. 61 
Bradley and Rosenzweig offer no explanation as to how managers 
"expropriate for themselves the wealth of both bondholders and stock-
holders. "62 During our study of the bankruptcy reorganization of 
54. Id. at 1077 n.77. 
55. See Betker, supra note 52; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 64-70. 
56. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, manuscript at 78. 
57. The passage reads: "[T]he principal deficiency of the existing law of corporate bank· 
ruptcy is that it leaves corporate controlfar some period in the hands of actors who do not suffer 
the economic consequences of their actions. Professor Gilson's findings do not suggest other-
wise." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.77. 
58. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, manuscript at 30-60, 64-74. 
59. Id., manuscript at 54-55 & nn.169, 171. 
60. Id., manuscript at 54-55. 
61. Gilson and Vetsuypens found that incumbent CEOs experienced large reductions in their 
real cash compensation when their companies went into default and that new CEOs hired from 
outside the firm received large increases in cash compensation relative to the CEOs they re-
placed. See Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 52, at 1, 15-16. 
62. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1052. In their brief economic analysis, id. at 
1050-54, Bradley and Rosenzweig referenced the literature of financial economics for the propo-
sition. that, by engaging in risky investments, managers can extract wealth from bondholders for 
the benefit of stockholders. Based on their finding that stockholder wealth declined under the 
Code, however, Bradley and Rosenzweig concluded that the financial economics literature must 
have "mis-specified the conflict." Id. at 1051. They propose the alternative theory that the man-
agers expropriated the wealth of stockholders and bondholders for themselves. Id. at 1051-52. 
They do not, however, even attempt to explain what the mechanics of that expropriation might 
have been. At times, they seem to suggest that "expropriate for themselves" does not mean that 
the managers captured the value, but rather that the value was lost through suboptimal invest-
ment decisions. See supra note 45. 
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large, publicly held companies, however, Whitford and I examined the 
compensation and other benefits that managers extracted from their 
companies. 63 Our examination included the plans and disclosure 
statements, the companies' SEC disclosures, articles in newspapers 
and trade journals, more than 120 interviews with lawyers who played 
key roles in the cases, and othei: sources. We specifically searched for 
the kinds of self-serving behavior that Bradley and Rosenzweig imag-
ine. While we found several incidents in which managers held up their 
companies for additional and probably excessive compensation64 or 
won releases from liability for their own wrongdoing, 65 the amounts 
involved were only a tiny fraction of the amounts that Bradley and 
Rosenzweig report missing. If the managers are expropriating for 
themselves the wealth of bondholders and stockholders, they are doing 
it by means that neither we nor the financial writers who covered these 
forty-three cases were able to detect. Bradley and Rosenzweig's image 
of managers as "actors who do not suffer the economic consequences 
of their actions" appears no more applicable to companies in financial 
distress than to those that remain in good health. 
III. CAN THE "MARKET" SUBSTITUTE FOR CHAPTER 11? 
Bradley and Rosenzweig do not purport to base their provocative 
call for the repeal of chapter 11 on their empirical findings. They ac-
knowledge that the direct implication of their finding that reorganiza-
tion under the Act was more efficient than reorganization under the 
Code is that Congress should repeal chapter 11 in favor of the former 
law. 66 It is on the basis of their nonempirical economic analysis that 
they conclude that court-supervised bankruptcy reorganization should 
63. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, manuscript at 70-74. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.80 ("Strictly speaking, therefore, our data 
support repeal of Chapter 11 in favor of the previous Chandler Act regime, but not necessarily 
outright abolition of court-supervised corporate reorganization."). 
Bradley and Rosenzweig make a second unwarranted extension of their data and analysis 
when they recommend repeal of chapter 11 for all companies based on data and analysis relevant 
only to large, publicly held companies. From 1981through1990, only 942 publicly held compa-
nies filed under chapter 11. See Securities Exchange Commission, Public Companies Filing 
Chapter 11 Petitions (on file with author). Those filings constituted only one half of one percent 
of the 194, 135 chapter 11 cases filed during those years. 
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be eliminated entirely. 67 
The heart of that analysis lies in the concluding section, appropri-
ately entitled "The Perfect Markets Solution to the Chapter 11 Di-
lemma." There the authors demonstrate that in the "hypothetical 
world of perfect markets" the problems of bankruptcy reorganization 
disappear, and "there is no economic justification for judicial interfer-
ence in the contractual relationship between corporate creditors and 













Total cases filed under Chapter 11 during the years 1981-1990 
Involuntary cases were listed separately in 1981-1982 
Ch. 1 ls Page Invols Page 
9,881 A-72 160 A-74 
18,543 A-62 278 A·64 
20,252 A-60 n/a n/a 
20,252 A-60 n/a n/a 
23,374 A-78 n/a n/a 
24,740 68 n/a n/a 
19,901 70 n/a n/a 
17,690 68 n/a n/a 
18,281 60 n/a n/a 
20,783 60 n/a n/a 
193,697 438 194,135 
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORK-
LOAD STATI511CS (1981-1990). Bradley and Rosenzweig acknowledge that their data are limited 
to publicly held companies but assert that their theoretical analysis arguably applies with equal 
force to private companies and challenge those who would limit them to demonstrate why the 
data for private companies, if available, would differ from the data for public companies. See 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.80. 
The answer to their challenge is that their proposal relies at every tum on the existence of 
efficient capital markets for both debt and equity. E.g., id. at 1081. The lack of data for private 
companies results from the fact that such markets are virtually nonexistent. Bradley and Rosen-
zweig attempt to assert that such markets are developing. See id. at 1081 n.87. But their exam-
ples of the "small" companies whose debt and equity have piqued the interest of speculators are 
actually examples of relatively large companies in comparison with the vast majority of compa-
nies that currently reorganize under chapter 11. For a sense of just how small the small compa-
nies are, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION 
OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 47 (1983) [herein-
after ABT STUDY] (showing the median assets of 236 companies reorganizing in U.S. Trustee 
pilot districts to have been $313,000 and the median assets of253 other companies reorganizing 
in nonpilot districts to have been $205,000); Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A 
Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 203-04 (1987) (showing the 
median assets of 48 companies reorganizing in the Eastern District of Wisconsin about 1983 to 
have been $318,983); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 51 AM. BANKR. LJ. 99, 120-21 (1983) (showing the median 
assets of 48 companies reorganizing in the Western District of Missouri about 1980 to have been 
$344,363). 
Bradley and Rosenzweig do not indicate the size of the companies they studied, but the 
median asset size of 49 publicly held companies filing under chapter 11 from October 1, 1985 to 
October 1, 1986 was $10.9 million. Securities Exchange Commission, Public Companies Filing 
Chapter 11 Petitions (on file with author). 
67. "In our view, however, reinstatement of the Chandler Act would be only a second·best 
solution; our economic analysis in Part II strongly suggests that the best solution would be to 
eliminate corporate bankruptcy reorganization entirely, in favor of our proposal." Bradley & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.80. 
68. Id. at 1053, 1054. 
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facetiously, the authors never crack a written smile. Instead, "build-
ing on the perfect markets solution to the Chapter 11 dilemma,"69 
they propose the repeal not only of chapter 1170 but of all other forms 
of court-supervised reorganization. 71 
According to Bradley and Rosenzweig, in the world that would 
follow, the financially distressed company would face no day of reck-
oning. Instead, when the company needed money to pay its debts, it 
would sell additional stock. Unless the firm was insolvent someone 
would always buy the stock.72 If the firm was insolvent, it would de-
fault, and the existing residual claimants (shareholders) would give up 
all claims to its value. They would be ousted from control of the firm 
immediately, 73 without judicial intervention. 74 Control would pass to 
next higher priority class, who would become the new shareholders. 75 
To those not already familiar with the economist's hypothetical 
world of perfect markets and zero transaction costs (hereinafter the 
PM-ZTC World), 16 this description must seem strange. But Bradley 
and Rosenzweig's strange visions do in fact follow from the strange 
assumptions upon which the PM-ZTC World is based. In their attack 
on chapter 11, Bradley and Rosenzweig have pushed those assump-
tions to their limits and demonstrated again how great are the differ-
ences between the world in which we live and the world in which so 
many economists do their thinking. A comparison of four problems 
69. Id. at 1077. 
70. See id. at 1088·89. 
71. See id. at 1078. 
72. See infra note 79. 
73. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1086. 
74. Id. at 1085. Bradley and Rosenzweig qualify their statement by noting: "Of course, the 
courts would retain their traditional role of enforcing property rights and contracts." Id. at 1085 
n.97. They cannot mean that the state courts will remove managers from office after they resolve 
disputes regarding default, because such removal would be far from "immediate" as they prom-
ised. Id. at 1086 ("[T]he common equity holders would be ousted from control of the firm 
immediately upon the firm's default .••• "). But neither can they mean that the state courts will 
remove managers without resolving disputes. They more probably have relied on the assumption 
that, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will reach an agreement that maximizes joint 
wealth. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. Under that assumption, the dispute would be 
resolved immediately, and the agreement itself would accomplish removal. 
15. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1084. 
76. In deciding to refer to this world as the PM-ZTC World, I have rejected the more com-
monly used Never-Never Land. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem 
of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 935 ("The Priest-Rubin result obtains only in the never-
never world of neoclassical economics, in which there are no transaction costs .••. "); Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1109 (discussing "a world 
very close to Coase's never-never land"); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against 
"Coaseanism'~ 99 YALE L.J. 611, 613 (1989) (discussing "never-never-world of zero transaction 
costs"). 
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addressed by chapter 11 and Bradley and Rosenzweig's PM-ZTC solu-
tions to those problems will illustrate my point. 
1. Illiquidity. In traditional bankruptcy theory, an asset is said to 
be "illiquid" when its value cannot easily be converted to cash. If the 
owner is forced to sell an illiquid asset under pressure of time, in a 
market in which there are too few buyers, or to buyers who must make 
major expenditures to evaluate the asset, the sale price may be consid-
erably less than the actual value of the asset. For example, state court 
judicial sale procedures are widely recognized to result in sales at 
prices that frequently are below the "market" value of the asset. 77 
Chapter 11 addresses the deficiencies of the marketplace by offering 
the owners, and more importantly the creditors, an alternative to put-
ting the debtor's assets on the auction block. By reaching an agree-
ment among themselves that relieves the company's financial distress, 
the debtor and creditors may be able to avoid the necessity for a costly 
sale at a depressed price. 
In the PM-ZTC world, the problem of illiquidity does not exist. 
Because the markets are assumed to be perfect, anything that has 
value can be sold for that value, immediately and costlessly. A corol-
lary to that proposition is that, if an asset cannot be sold for its puta-
tive value of $]{, it does not have that value. Perhaps the sharpest 
difference between the PM-ZTC World and the world of traditional 
bankruptcy theory regards initial public stock or bond offerings. In 
the latter world, making an initial public offering of securities in a 
financially distressed company is virtually impossible. 78 But in the 
PM-ZTC World, one can make an initial public offering to save a com-
pany from financial disaster, to make the company's monthly pay-
77. See, e.g., Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 939 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(finding that foreclosure sale of debtor's home for between 69.5% and 77.6% of its "fair market 
value" compared favorably with the typical foreclosure sale in the area). 
78. In our study of the largest 43 companies to reorganize through chapter 11 in the period 
from October 1, 1979 to March 15, 1988, Whitford and I found that none resolved its financial 
crisis by means of an initial public offering. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 97; see 
also Dwight Cass, Street Expects Flurry of Post-Restructuring IPOs in the 1990s, CORP. FINANC· 
ING WK., June 3, 1991, at 1 (discussing the use of public offerings by creditors after the debtor 
company has emerged from chapter 11 and quoting James Harris, managing director and head of 
Lehman Brothers' financial restructuring group, as saying, "You need a situation that will look 
to investors like a normal, well-capitalized company"); Gretchen Morgenson, From Busto to 
IPO, FORBES, Oct. 30, 1989, at 14 (noting that Cable Applications, Inc.'s initial public offering 
while in chapter 11 "may be a first on Wall Street"). For a case in which a debtor attempted 
unsuccessfully to emerge from Chapter 11 through a public offering, see Conforte v. United 
States, 125 B.R. 287 (D. Nev. 1991), discussed in United Press International, Federal Trustee 
Says Brothel Could Reopen Thursday or Friday, Sept. 19, 1990 (reporting two failed attempts by 
the Mustang Ranch to emerge from chapter 11 through the making of a public offering of stock) 
(available on NEXIS). 
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ments,79 or to buy a chocolate bar. The assumption of perfect markets 
enables Bradley and Rosenzweig to reach the conclusion that, in the 
PM-ZTC World, when management can no longer raise capital 
through the sale of stock, the debts of the company exceed the value of 
its assets. 80 
2. Communication and coordination. During the bankruptcy re-
organization of large, publicly held companies, a great deal of time 
and effort goes into coordinating the activities of the thousands of 
stakeholders. Within the scheme of intermediation81 laid down by 
chapter 11, the parties struggle over the appointment of official com-
mittees, 82 the precise groups the committees will represent, 83 and the 
information resources they should have. 84 Communication is diffi-
cult. 85 Merely to send a formal notice to the creditors and sharehold-
ers themselves may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and take 
several months. Direct negotiations among so many parties are 
79. Bradley & Rosenzweig labor over a precise statement of whether the debtor would make 
a public offering to obtain the money necessary to make particular debt payments that are due: 
If [the value of the firm's equity after making the payment is greater than the amount of the 
payment that is due], then there is positive net equity in the firm and, assuming an efficient 
capital market, managers could issue new equity shares to finance the debt payments that 
are currently due. If [that expression] does not hold, then there is no equity in the firm, and 
managers could not sell new equity to finance the current debt payments •..• 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1082 (footnote omitted). 
80. See id. 
81. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 154-85. 
[R]eorganization plans are not directly negotiated by the parties in interest, but rather by 
intermediaries functioning as the parties' representatives. The effects of intermediation are 
compounded by perplexing layers of agency. For example, a public bondholder may be 
represented in the chapter 11 case by an indenture trustee, which is usually the trust depart-
ment of a bank. The bank may retain a member of a private law firm to conduct the repre-
sentation. If the indenture trustee is appointed to membership on the unsecured creditors' 
committee, the lawyer may be the one who attends the meetings. The committee will retain 
a bankruptcy lawyer to represent itself in negotiations with the debtor and the representa-
tives of shareholders. 
Id. at 154. 
82. In three of the 43 cases (7%) that Whitford and I studied, equity holders were defeated in 
bids to form equity committees. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 191. Committee status 
is worth struggling over; it assures that the group represented will be present at the bargaining 
table and virtually assures that the group will share in the distribution under the plan, even in the 
complete and obvious absence of a legal entitlement. See id. at 158-60, 190-93. 
83. Even though the unsecured creditors' committee represents the holders of subordinated 
debt in the absence of a separate committee, investors who acquire substantial holdings in the 
subordinated debt of reorganizing companies typically seek the formation of a separate commit-
tee to represent only the subordinated debt. See id. at 160-63. 
84. For example, creditors' committees generally succeed more often than do equity commit-
tees in winning the right to retain financial advisers to assist them in the process of plan formula-
tion. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 118 & n.334. 
85. For an illustration of the difficulty of communicating with large numbers of stakeholders, 
see In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 220-23 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (discussing whether 
and how securities dealers who hold bonds for customers notify the customers of the vote and the 
problems of authority created when the securities dealers attempt to vote the bond for or against 
a plan of reorganization). 
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unthinkable. 86 
Under the assumptions of the PM-ZTC World, these problems 
also disappear, enabling thousands of corporate stakeholders to act 
virtually as one. Without transaction costs, both communications and 
negotiations are free and instantaneous. The predominant strain of 
the PM-ZTC World, utilized by Bradley and Rosenzweig, assumes 
that parties always accept proposals that are in their interests. 87 This 
powerful assumption enables Bradley and Rosenzweig to propose that 
each of a debtor's creditors be entitled to have its own contract gov-
erning the firm's operating strategies and to "strictly enforce" it. 88 
In a world with transaction costs, debtors might well inadver-
tently89 or strategically90 agree to contracts whose inconsistencies pre-
cluded their simultaneous strict enforcement. Indeed, sorting out 
inconsistencies among the rights of competing creditors is frequently 
cited as one of the primary purposes of chapter 11. 91 But Bradley and 
Rosenzweig correctly surmised that in the PM-ZTC World any incon-
86. For an account of the complexity of a negotiation involving approximately 400 banks, see 
MICHAEL MORITZ & BARRETI SEAMAN, GOING FOR BROKE: THE CHRYSLER STORY 297·318 
(1981). The Chrysler negotiations could be limited to the 400 banks because the negotiators were 
willing to accept a deviation from the absolute priority rule; they permitted the nonbank credi· 
tors, who had equal priority with them, to be paid in full in the ordinary course of business. 
Under Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal, no such limiting would occur. Their proposal would 
"ensure adherence to the rule of absolute priority by precluding payments to junior claimants 
when senior claims are not fully paid." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085. This, they 
tell us, "would eliminate uncertainties currently associated with the reorganization process and 
thereby increase the utility of risk-averse investors, who would be willing to pay a premium for 
the certainty afforded by strict application of the absolute priority rule." Id. (footnote omitted). 
87. Critics of the Coase Theorem have called into question Coase's assumption that parties 
will always settle merely because it is in their interest to settle. Coase has responded that "there 
is good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached will be 
small." RONALD CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 161 (1988); see Stewart 
Schwab, Cease Defends Cease: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH L. REV. 
1171, 1174-78 (1989) (reviewing CoASE, supra). Abandonment of the assumption that parties 
will make the deals they should make, even if they are in a bilateral monopoly, would deflate 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument, even in the PM-ZTC World. Chapter 11 would be neces· 
sary to impose on irrational parties the deals they should have made. See, e.g., supra note 74 and 
accompanying text. 
88. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1087. 
89. In small transactions, debtors might be beaten in the "battle of the forms." That is, they 
might be bound to provisions contained in unread boilerplate on purchase orders or other con· 
tract documents. In large transactions, debtors might misinterpret particular contract provisions 
as consistent when they were not. 
90. For example, a debtor that needed a loan and could not get it any other way might 
conceal conflicting contractual obligations from a prospective later lender. 
91. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 2: 
The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative matter 
and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for 
the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around. Because creditors 
have conflicting rights, there is a tendency in their debt-collection efforts to make a bad 
situation worse. 
Id. at 10. 
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sistency among the agreements could easily be resolved by further 
agreement when the inconsistency came to light. In that world, to talk 
of managers "approach[ing] debtholders to strike a mutually advanta-
geous bargain" to accept particular investment projects is entirely real-
istic,92 even though debt holders number in the thousands and none 
can be bound without its consent. In the PM-ZTC World, the parties 
could know in advance that, at the time of the renegotiation, any par-
ties with inconsistent rights would agree on a course of action that 
maximized the group's joint wealth and divided that wealth among 
them in a manner that left everyone better off. 93 
3. Relief from contractual default provisions. Another important 
function of chapter 11 is to relieve debtors from the sometimes draco-
nian provisions of loan agreements that specify the effects of default. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig tell us that, under their proposal, enforce-
ment of the creditor's bargain would occur automatically upon de-
fault. That is, the law they would have Congress adopt in place of 
chapter 11 "would leave ... the definition of default to contracts ... 
between the company and its claimholders,"94 and provide "for auto-
matic cancellation of residual claims [shareholdings] in the event of 
default."95 They apparently mean that if any96 contract with a credi-
tor goes into default, the common stock of the company will, to use 
their word, "evaporate."97 Readers who fall into the trap of analogiz-
ing to the world in which they live might be concerned about the pos-
sibility that a PM-ZTC World debtor might default on a single, small 
debt, thereby converting the remainder of the company's debt to stock, 
perhaps to the great distress of the latter's owners.98 In the PM-ZTC 
92. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1088 n.107. 
93. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
94. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1078. 
95. Id. 
96. My conclusion that Bradley and Rosenzweig contemplate that a single default would 
trigger evaporation of the stock rests on the following passages: "This repeal of Chapter 11 
would permit corporate claimants to enforce these contracts strictly in the event of default, since 
the law would no longer provide for a stay of enforcement actions in that event." Id. at 1078. 
(Chapter 11 provides a stay that applies to, and can be lifted with regard to, each creditor sepa-
rately. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (d) (1988)). "A critical feature of our proposal, however, is that each 
creditor would be able to bind the firm to strictly enforceable default-contingent contracts." Id. 
at 1084 n.94. Had they contemplated that only defaults in particular kinds of debts would trig-
ger the cancellation, Bradley and Rosenzweig would have faced the problem of providing a rem-
edy through which to enforce the debt that could not trigger cancellation. 
97. "[Flor all intents and purposes, the firm's equity securities will 'evaporate.' " Id. at 1082. 
In the PM-ZTC World, this should not be cause for alarm. Things often go in and out of exist-
ence quite suddenly. 
98. In the PM-ZTC World, whether one owns debt or equity does not matter. One can be 
exchanged in the perfect market for an equivalent value of the other, without incurring transac-
tion costs. But actual debt holders often exhibit a strong preference to remain in that status. See 
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM. L. 
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World, however, that could not happen. First, because any default 
would evaporate both the shares of the company and the tenure in 
office of the managers, managers would put off default as long as possi-
ble. All debts would go into default simultaneously.99 
Second, even if default happened otherwise, it would not matter. 
For example, some bookkeeper's oversight in failing to mail a check 
on time could evaporate billions of dollars of stock of a Fortune 500 
company. In a world with transaction costs, that might throw the 
affairs of both the company and its shareholders into chaos. But, be-
cause chaos is not Kaldor-Hicks Pareto Optimal, 100 in the PM-ZTC 
World it is not a possible state of affairs. If a disorderly evaporation 
were to occur,1°1 it would be only momentary. Again, the PM-ZTC 
assumption that parties always agree to what is in their interests saves 
the day. The creditors and shareholders would promptly meet and use 
their complete information102 to select a Pareto Optimal state for the 
group. That state might be a waiver of the default accompanied by 
condensation103 of managers and stock. Alternatively, it might leave 
them in their gaseous state and recapitalize the company. In the PM-
ZTC World, what capital structure was created would not matter; one 
would be as good as another.104 
4. Soft landings for managers and shareholders. In the world of 
imperfect markets and transaction costs, extricating the productive re-
sources of a failed business from the managers and owners who pre-
sided over the failure can be difficult. Failed owners and managers 
REV. 527, 532 (1983) (arguing that creditors' preference for debt rather than equity is so great 
that it frequently causes reorganizing companies to issue more debt than they can pay). 
99. Bradley and Rosenzweig consistently refer to default as an event that occurs with regard 
to a class of debt rather than a single creditor. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 
1079-88. 
100. See generally Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939). 
101. The subjunctive is employed to indicate that it is in fact impossible. Bradley and Rosen-
zweig correctly describe the PM-ZTC World default process as follows: 
[T]he elimination of the firm's equity holders and the erosion of their holdings would be a 
slow, orderly process. 
Because of this feature, our proposal would also obviate the need for an automatic stay 
• . . . [U]nder our proposal there would be little, if any, concern that nervous creditors 
would race one another to the courthouse in order to convert their claims into priority 
judgments against a firm on the verge of "failure." 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085 & n.98. 
102. In a world without transaction costs, it is feasible to obtain all relevant information. 
"Thus," in the world imagined by Bradley and Rosenzweig, "at every point in time, capital 
market agents would be evaluating the firm's securities in light of the promised payments and the 
distribution of terminal values. Market participants would continually assess the firm's need and 
ability to issue new shares to meet its debt obligations." ld. at 1085. 
103. The reverse of evaporation. 
104. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN. REV. 261 (1958). 
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commonly cling to their positions, dispute default on bases both real 
and imagined, and hunker down in place until the appeals have been 
exhausted and the sheriff comes to eject them on the day of reckoning. 
Particularly bitter ones sometimes lay waste to everything they cannot 
take with them as they begin to evaporate.105 Whitford and I have 
argued elsewhere that chapter 11 plays a crucial role in removing 
failed management and shifting ownership and control of large, pub-
licly held companies to their true residual owners.106 It does these 
things in a manner that is emotionally less than satisfying107 but strik-
ingly effective. Tainted managers are nearly certain to be removed; 108 
control of an insolvent company almost invariably changes hands.109 
Bradley and Rosenzweig assert that, under their proposal, the 
ouster of management from control of the failed company would oc-
cur immediately on default, 110 without the need for judicial interven-
tion, 111 leaving the sacked managers without the leverage needed to 
negotiate a deviation from the absolute priority rule. 112 Here, too, 
their characterization of life in the PM-ZTC World is accurate. That 
world features no day of reckoning, 113 no disputing, 114 and no ability 
105. See, e.g., In re KenDavis Indus. Intl., 91 B.R. 742, 750 (Banlcr. N.D. Tex. 1988) ("Mr. 
Davis instructed Locke Purnell to lay waste to all, unless the banks agreed to his terms of settle-
ment. He dictated a war of 'scorched earth' leaving what remained after the battle to the institu-
tional creditors."). 
106. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note SO, at 78-81; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 41, 
at 17-19. 
107. The current system by which failed managers are removed from office is both erratic 
and unprincipled. Depending on their sense of timing and their skills, some of the failed manag-
ers of the large, publicly held companies Whitford and I studied were able to "sell" their resigna-
tions to the companies' stakeholders in return for generous severance packages and releases for 
their misconduct, while others were forced out of office and subjected to both civil and criminal 
litigation. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 70.74. 
108. Whitford and I found that 95% of CEOs who led their companies into financial distress 
· were out of office by the end of the chapter 11 case. Id. at 66-67. 
109. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 41, at 17-19. In all but two of 30 insolvent companies 
studied, controlling blocks of shares were issued to creditors. Id. at 30.31. 
110. "[T]he common equity holders would be ousted from control of the firm immediately 
upon the firm's default on its obligation to pay senior creditors." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra 
note 4, at 1086. 
111. See supra note 74. 
112. "In addition, our proposal would ensure adherence to the rule of absolute priority by 
precluding payments to junior claimants when senior claims are not fully paid." Bradley & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085. 
113. Under our proposal, there would be no "day of reckoning" and no need for a court-
supervised sale or recapitalization of the firm. Rather, as the market learned more about the 
distribution of terminal values, the values of the firm's securities and its contingent securities 
would adjust accordingly. Thus, the elimination of the firm's equity holders ..• would be a 
slow, orderly process. 
Id. 
114. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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to resist the determination of the Market.115 As they point out, the 
destruction of value (as opposed to the threat of such destruction) is 
flatly impossible.116 The creditors and the would-be destroyer reach 
an agreement that preserves the property and divides the resulting in-
crease in wealth between them in such a way that both are better off 
than if the property had been destroyed. 117 
Chapter 11 exists solely to deal with transaction costs. It should 
be apparent by now that Bradley and Rosenzweig are correct in their 
conclusion that there is no need for court-supervised reorganization in 
a world without transaction costs. A perfect market would be a per-
fect substitute for chapter 11; in a PM-ZTC world, chapter 11 should 
be repealed. The issue is what significance should be accorded conclu-
sions from the PM-ZTC World in evaluating proposals for reform of 
the world in which we live. 
IV. MOVING BETWEEN WORLDS 
Bradley and Rosenzweig,s economic analysis of bankruptcy reor-
ganization tells us more about economic analysis than about bank-
ruptcy reorganization. The way problems melt away in this PM-ZTC 
World seems at first elegant, then suspicious, and finally boring. 
Every new proposal seems to maximize societal wealth. 
The reason is simple. In this strange PM-ZTC World, every new 
proposal does maximize societal wealth. The explanation is captured 
most concisely in the Coase Theorem: In the absence of transaction 
costs, parties will reach an agreement that maximizes joint wealth. 118 
From this Theorem is derived the invariance thesis: The parties in-
volved in a particular legal system (imaginary world) will reach the 
same efficient result regardless of initial legal entitlements.119 Though 
the deal making necessary to eliminate inefficiencies may shift wealth 
among the bargaining parties, it eliminates the inefficiencies perfectly 
and completely. No matter what rule or structure is legislated, when 
115. One must always maximize one's utility. See infra note 126. 
116. "In this hypothetical world of perfect markets, valuable finn·specific capital could never 
be destroyed." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4 at 1053. 
117. Bradley and Rosenzweig do not attempt to explain how the immediate ouster they 
promise would come about. The method described here is my own conjecture. 
118. Coase himself never directly stated the Theorem, with the result that it appears in sev-
eral versions. This one comes from Schwab, supra note 87, at 1174. 
119. See id. at 1178. The invariance thesis is sometimes referred to as the strong version of 
the Coase Theorem. While it ignores the fact that wealth effects could feed back to affect the 
precise nature of the efficient result achieved, in the context of the reorganization of large, pub-
licly held companies, that qualification is insignificant. Wealth effects are most likely to feed 
back when they give weight to a particular group's preferences regarding consumption. Id. nt 
1178-83. 
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the deal making is over, that rule or structure maximizes societal 
wealth just as well as any other. 
Unfortunately for Bradley and Rosenzweig in their call for repeal 
of chapter 11, the Theorem means not only that the same amount of 
smoke would be released from the factory's chimney whether the fac-
tory owner or the householder were legally responsible for the smoke 
damage, 120 but also that the most efficient course will be taken to reor-
ganize a company, whether the law entitles managers to hide them-
selves and their companies from creditors in chapter 11 or not. 
Answers to complex social and economic problems flow so easily in a 
world without transaction costs that anybody who proposes doing 
anything about a perceived problem can easily be bested. Whatever is 
(or can be imagined), is efficient.121 
The proof for the besting of Bradley and Rosenzweig proceeds as 
follows. If, in the PM-ZTC World, chapter 11 imposed large social 
costs on creditors through inefficient operation of the business and 
looting by management, the debt collection system would still operate 
with perfect efficiency. Creditors would simply bribe122 shareholders 
or managers (whichever controlled the company in the particular vari-
ant of the PM-ZTC World imagined) not to file the chapter 11 case.123 
The bribe would serve the interests of creditors because it would be 
less than the costs that could be imposed on them through the chapter 
11 filing; it would serve the interests of shareholders and managers 
because it would enable them to walk away with more than they could 
get by actually filing the chapter 11 case. The existence of chapter 11 
120. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
121. Easterbrook has made an interesting use of these properties of the PM-ZTC World. 
Instead of arguing from rules to the conclusion that they are efficient, he argues that the rules 
must be efficient or the bargain of the parties would have been to change them. Easterbrook, 
supra note 2, at 411 ("Legal rules endure because they are efficient or because they transfer 
wealth. Transfers are an implausible explanation of the current bankruptcy regime, leaving effi-
ciency as the prevailing explanation."). 
122. As used here and in economic theory, the term bribe does not imply that the payment is 
illegal or improper. It indicates only that one person is paying to acquire the legal entitlements 
of another or induce the other to use them in a particular way. The payment proposed here 
would not be illegal or improper. See infra note 123. 
123. An agreement by the debtor not to file a chapter 11 case would not be legally enforcea-
ble against the debtor. See LoPucKI, supra note 44, at 104. But the shareholders could cause 
the company to surrender its assets to creditors in return for a bribe (cash payment) in an appro-
priate amount. If bribing management were necessary (because they were assumed to have some 
independence from shareholders), the propriety of the transaction could be preserved by paying 
the bribe to shareholders. The shareholders would pay a portion of the money to the managers 
in the form of severance pay or the purchase of the managers' employment contracts. 
Bowers has developed another analysis that reaches the same happy, wealth.maximizing re-
sult without the necessity for bribes. He shows that, in the PM-ZTC World, debtors actually will 
liquidate their own estates prior to bankruptcy, rendering the existence of bankruptcy irrelevant. 
Bowers, supra note 2. In the PM-ZTC World, many other solutions probably exist to the prob-
lem of the social cost of bankruptcy. 
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might or might not make managers and shareholders wealthier at the 
expense of creditors, 124 but there is little reason to believe its continu-
ing existence would increase Total (Social) Costs.125 In the PM-ZTC 
World, no one can do anything that does not maximize his own util-
ity, 126 and with it the utility of society.121 An unused chapter 11 is 
harmless, so its repeal is unnecessary.12s 
As the simplistic nature of this slippery World comes into focus, 
the limited value of its study becomes clear. That the primary use of 
the Coase Theorem has been as a tool for economists to study the PM-
ZTC World is ironic. Consistent with the view presented here, Coase 
himself saw his Theorem as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of PM-
ZTC reasoning - proof that the PM-ZTC World was getting too 
much attention: 
[W]hile consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transac-
tion costs can give us valuable insights, these insights are, in my view, 
without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world 
of positive transaction costs. We do not do well to devote ourselves to a 
detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining 
the future by the minute inspection of the entrails of a goose. 129 
Coase's concession that study of the PM-ZTC World can give valuable 
insights is necessary, but narrow. To put it in perspective, remember 
that the intense study of fantasy novels can probably also give us valu-
able insights.130 
To date, legal scholarship has generally accorded conclusions 
based on the assumptions of perfect markets or zero transaction costs 
124. See Schwab, supra note 87, at 1178-83. 
125. What reason there is springs from the possibility that a wealthier management class 
might have different consumption preferences than a wealthier shareholder or creditor class. In 
the context of the reorganization oflarge, publicly held companies, these wealth effects would be 
minimal. See supra note 119. 
126. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 18 CAL. L. REV. 815, 
828 (1990) ("[W]hat each individual does by definition maximizes his or her utility."). 
127. This proposition is inherent in the Coase Theorem. See supra note 118 and accompany-
ing text. Not only are the parties to the immediate transaction maximizing utility, so are all 
other actors in the system. 
128. One could counter that, in thePM-ZTC World, repeal of chapter 11 would be effortless. 
Though there would be no reason to repeal chapter 11, neither would there be reason not to 
repeal it. Because all actions in the PM-ZTC World are effortless, the issue of what should be 
done in such circumstances recurs. In making the textual statement, I have implicitly assumed 
that the concept of inertia should apply even under the twin assumptions of perfect markets and 
zero transaction costs. Whether my assumption is correct cries out for further analysis, a task I 
must leave to others. 
129. R.H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 
183, 187 (1981). The inconsistency between Coase's own views and the uses to which his work 
has been put is explored in Ellickson, supra note 76. 
130. For example, many people claim to have gained insights through study of J.R.R. 
TOLKEIN, THE HOBBIT (1937). 
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a kind of presumptive validity until they can be disproved empirically. 
The burden has been on the attacker to explain "why the market 
failed."131 Drawing PM-ZTC-based conclusions has assumed the 
mantle of high theory; empirically refuting them has been granted a 
lower status, insuring that less of it will be done. In the intellectual 
environment so created, Bradley and Rosenzweig are able to acknowl-
edge explicitly that "[t]he relevance or applicability of the perfect mar-
kets solution to the real world depends on the efficiency of the 
pertinent real-world markets"132 and then move directly to the conclu-
sion that the perfect markets solution should be implemented by re-
pealing chapter 11 without having to argue the efficiency of the 
pertinent real-world markets.133 
As yet, no one has demonstrated that any relationship at all exists 
between the way things work in the PM-ZTC World and the way 
things work in the world in which we live. No basis exists for assum-
ing that, because a proposition is entirely true in the former world, it is 
even a little bit true in the latter. To prove that a necessary premise of 
an argument is false is to defeat the argument. By that standard, all 
arguments that depend on PM-ZTC assumptions fail, as do all at-
tempts to import conclusions from the PM-ZTC World. The assump-
tions of perfect markets and zero transaction costs are not 
"theoretical." They are false. Their falsity renders attempts to set 
public policy on the basis of conclusions reached in the PM-ZTC 
World nothing more than arguments by loose analogy. 
The PM-ZTC World is just one in a countless number of hypothet-
ical worlds that the human mind can imagine. By pushing the as-
sumptions of that strange world to their limits, Bradley and 
Rosenzweig have painted a surrealistic landscape in which financial 
markets guarantee the absence of financial distress and chapter 11 is 
unnecessary. In their attempt to discredit chapter 11, they have in-
stead discredited the means of economic analysis they employed. Now 
that we have seen what is possible in the PM-ZTC World, perhaps we 
are ready to consider that it may have little to teach us. It may be, as 
131. Bradley & Rosenzweig explicitly attempt to place the burden, saying that: 
In view of the work of these scholars and the theoretical and empirical analyses that we 
offer, one can question whether there is any persuasive theory justifying Chapter 11 insofar 
as corporate bankruptcies are concerned. It seems to us that, at the very least, proponents 
of Chapter 11 ought to bear the burden of proving that it does more good than harm. 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1086 n.102. 
132. Id. at 1054. 
133. In fact, neither market appears to be well developed. See supra note 78 (discussing 
market for public offerings); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 95-98 & nn. 271-81 (discuss-
ing market for distressed companies). 
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Coase himself suggests, no more than a tautology so elegant that it has 
mesmerized a generation of legal scholars. 
